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Accommodating Labor's Section 7
Rights to Picket, Solicit, and
Distribute Literature on QuasiPublic Property with the Owners'
Property Rights
By Donald T. O'Connor*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Almost a quarter of a century ago, the Supreme Court handed down its
landmark decision in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox.' The Court held that
an employer may prohibit nonemployee union organizers from distributing literature to its employees on company property if the employees are
not beyond the reasonable reach of the union and the no-access rule does
not discriminate against the union.' Since Babcock & Wilcox, the development of the law regarding the right of nonemployee organizers to solicit
employees on private property not open to the public has followed a predictable path. However, when the property concerned is open to the public (quasi-public), and other types of activity protected by section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act (Act or NLRA) 8 are also affected, the law
* Partner in the firm of Buchanan, Ingersoll, Rodewald, Kyle & Buerger, P.C., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. University of Buffalo (B.S., 1957); Boston College Law School (LL.B.,
1966). Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
1. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
2. Id. at 112.
3. The present National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976), had its beginning with the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
The 1935 Act was amended by the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947,
Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136. The Act was further amended by the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519. A
final amendment was the Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395. All subsequent references will be to the "NLRA" or the "Act".
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has not followed predictable paths and is in a high state of flux. Although
five years ago the Supreme Court in Hudgens v. NLRB 4 overruled its decision in Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,5 a review of recent decisions of the National Labor Relations Board (Board or
NLRB) and the courts suggests that the right of nonemployee union representatives to come onto quasi-public property to engage in protected
activities has actually expanded during that period. This is especially true
if the activity includes picketing or handbilling of customers at multiemployer locations.
In the past few months, the Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals have handed down three significant decisions that dealt with the
application of the Babcock & Wilcox principles to organizational handbilling, area standard picketing, and picketing in support of an economic
strike on quasi-public property. The Fourth Circuit, in Hutzler Brothers
Co. v. NLRB,' refused to enforce a Board Order which held that the operator of a freestanding retail department store violated the Act when he
threatened to have arrested nonemployee organizers who were handbilling store employees on store premises. The court found that there was
not substantial evidence on the record to show that the union could not
have reached the employees by other reasonable efforts. In a case concerning area standard picketing, Giant Food Markets, Inc. v. NLRB,' the
Sixth Circuit refused to enforce a Board Order and remanded the case to
the Board with instructions to take further evidence on the effects this
picketing would have at the perimeter of a two-store shopping center as
contrasted with picketing on the premises at the entrance to the picketed
store. Finally, in a novel case concerning a commercial office building, Seattle-FirstNational Bank v. NLRB,8 the Ninth Circuit agreed with the
Board and held that a union could station pickets in a foyer in front of
the entrance to a restaurant on the forty-sixth floor of an office building.
This article will examine and analyze these and other recent decisions
of the Board and the courts dealing with organized labor's rights under
section 7 of the Act to engage in such activities as picketing, solicitation,
and distribution of literature to employees, customers, and the public on
privately-owned property which is open to the public (such as shopping
centers, office buildings, and industrial parks).

4.
5.

424 U.S. 507 (1976).
391 U.S. 308 (1968).

6.
7.
8.

630 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1980).
633 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1980).
105 L.R.R.M. 3411 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 1980).
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II.

BABCOCK & WILCOX AND ITS PROGENY-AN OVERVIEW

The lodestar in the area concerning nonemployees' rights of access to
an employer's property is the Supreme Court's 1956 decision in Babcock
& Wilcox. In that case, the company had refused access to nonemployee
organizers for the purpose of distributing union literature to its employees in the company-owned parking lot. The company had a manufacturing plant in a rural area, and more than ninety percent of its employees
drove to work and parked in the company's parking lot. Because of traffic
conditions, organizers were not able effectively to distribute union literature to employees as they entered and left the employer's property. The
Board held that the company had violated the Act by refusing an organizer limited access to company property.
The Court noted that the company's no-access policy did not discriminate against unions and that "other means of communication, such as the
mail and telephones, as well as" home visits were available to the union.10
In a unanimous decision, the Court said:
[Aln employer may validly post his property against nonemployee distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union through
other available channels of communication will enable it to reach the
employees with its message and if the employer's notice of order does
not discriminate against the union by allowing other distribution."
In attempting to reconcile employers' property rights with employees' organizational rights, the Court stated, "[aiccommodation between the two
must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the
maintenance of the other. The employer may not affirmatively interfere
with organization; the union may not always insist that the employer aid
organization."'"
The distinction between rules of law applicable to employees and those
applicable to nonemployees is a substantive one. Absent unusual circumstances, no restrictions may be placed on the rights of employees to discuss self-organization among themselves during non-working time. The
Court remarked, however, that no such obligation is owed nonemployees
since their rights are governed by different considerations and then said:
The right of self-organization depends in some measure on the ability of
employees to learn the advantages of self-organization from others. Consequently, if the location of a plant and the living quarters of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable Union ef9.
10.
11.
12.

Babcock & Wilcox Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 485, 34 L.R.R.M. 1373 (1954).
351 U.S. at 107.
Id. at 112 (emphasis supplied).

Id.
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forts to communicate with them, the employer must allow the Union to
approach his employees on his property.'
had in mind situations in which the employThis suggests that the Court
14
ees were in remote areas.
The genesis of the Board's doctrine on access to quasi-public property
is the Supreme Court's decision in Logan Valley and its own decision in
Solo Cup Co.15 Logan Valley concerned area standard picketing of a supermarket in a newly-opened multi-store shopping center. The shopping
center owner and the supermarket obtained an injunction in state court
prohibiting the union from picketing on the shopping center premises.
The majority decision, written by Justice Marshall, stated: "[Pleaceful
picketing carried on in a location open generally to the public is, absent
other factors involving the purpose or manner of the picketing, protected
by the First Amendment."16 The Court remarked that if the shopping
premises were part of a business area of a municipality, the union could
not be barred from exercising its first amendment right of free speech.
Further, the Court said that the modern day shopping center is the
"functional equivalent" of the business district of the company-owned
town 7 referred to in the Court's landmark decision in Marsh v.
Alabama.18
In that case, the Court held that a person was protected by the first
and fourteenth amendments when he passed out religious literature on a
sidewalk in a company-owned town. The majority in Logan Valley concluded that, "because the shopping center serves as the community business block 'and is freely accessible and open to the [public],' . . . the
State may not delegate the power.., to exclude those members of the
public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the premises
1"'by means of peaceful picketing. Two months after the Court
handed down its decision in Logan Valley the Board applied that holding, in Solo Cup Co.,20 to organizational solicitation in an industrial park.
13. Id. at 113 (emphasis supplied).
14. Two other Board cases were considered by the Court along with Babcock & Wilcox-Seamprufe, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 24, 34 L.R.R.M. 1293 (1954), enforcement denied,
NLRB v. Seamprufe, Inc., 222 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1955), afl'd, NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956); and Ranco, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 493, 34 L.R.R.M. 1486 (1954), enforced, NLRB v. Ranco, Inc., 222 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1955), rev'd, NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
15. 172 N.L.R.B. 1110, 68 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1968), enforcement denied, NLRB v. Solo
Cup Co., 422 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1970).
16. 391 U.S. at 313 (citations omitted).
17. Id. at 318.
18. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
19. 391 U.S. at 319 (citation omitted).
20. 172 N.L.R.B. 1110, 68 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1968).
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The Board ruled that the industrial park was clearly analogous to the
shopping center in Logan Valley."
The Court's holding in Logan Valley was controversial and short-lived.
In 1972, the newly-constituted Burger Court handed down on the same
day two cases that implicitly overruled the Logan Valley decision: Central HardwareCo. v. NLRB2" and Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.2 s Justice Powell
delivered the Court's opinions in both cases.
Central Hardware concerned two large, freestanding hardware stores.
Nonemployee union organizers were stopped by company representatives
from soliciting the store's employees in the parking lot at both stores. The
Board found that the employer had violated the Act and reasoned that,
since the store was open to the public, the Court's holding in Logan Valley was applicable."4 Referring to Logan Valley, Justice Powell said:
Before an owner of private property can be subjected to the commands
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments the privately owned property
must assume to some significant degree the functional attributes of public property devoted to public use... . The only fact relied upon for the
argument that Central's parking lots have acquired the characteristics of
a public municipal facility is that they are "open to the public.". . . We
hold that the Board . .. erred in applying Logan Valley to this case."

The Court remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit for consideration
under the principles of Babcock & Wilcox."
In Lloyd, anti-war protesters were arrested for peacefully distributing
handbills inside a shopping mall. Justice Powell stated that there had
been no "dedication" of the mall to public use so as to entitle the demon21. Id. at 1111, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1386.
22. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
23. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
24. 181 N.L.R.B. 491, 73 L.R.R.M. 1422 (1970).
25. 407 U.S. at 547 (emphasis supplied).
26. On remand, the Eighth Circuit held that there was not substantial evidence on the
record as a whole to support the finding of the Trial Examiner that no other reasonable
means were available for the union to reach the employees. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB,
468 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1972). The court noted there was "no evidence that any efforts were
made to reach the employees by letter, newspaper or radio advertising or by invitations to
union meetings." 468 F.2d at 255. The court cited the Board's decision in Monogram Models, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 705, 77 L.R.R.M. 1913 (1971), and noted that the Board had eschewed adopting a "big city" presumption that there are no reasonable ways available to
solicit employees in major metropolitan areas without access to an employer's property. The
court quoted from the Board's decision in Monogram Models, in which the Board said: "the
test established (in Babcock & Wilcox) was not one of relative convenience, but rather
whether the location of a plant and the living quarters of the employees place the employees
beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them. . . ." 468 F.2d at
256, quoting 192 N.L.R.B. at 706, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1914 (emphasis in original).
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strators to first amendment rights that are unrelated to the mall's operation. The Court distinguished Marsh on its facts because the company
town had "all the attributes" of a municipality.27 The anti-war protesters
in Lloyd had no connection with any of the businesses located in the
mall, whereas the picketing in Logan Valley, the Court noted, was connected with the labor relations of one of the stores located in the center.
Justice Marshall wrote a blistering dissent, and he was joined by Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart.3 ' Justice Marshall thought that the
Court's holding and reasoning in Lloyd impliedly overrulled Logan
2
Valley. '
A series of decisions by the Board and courts,3 0 standing for the proposition that employers located on quasi-public premises (e.g., shopping
centers) could deprive nonemployee organizers of access, followed the
Court's holding in Central Hardware and Lloyd. The right to solicit and
to distribute literature to employees on company premises was to be protected only if the union could demonstrate, under the Babcock & Wilcox
test, that the non-access rule had been applied discriminatorily or that
the union had no other reasonable means to communicate with the employees. In Dexter Thread Mills,31 the Board stated that the union's contention that the property was "quasi-public" was moot under the Court's
holding in Central Hardware.
Four years after Central Hardware and Lloyd were decided, the Court
issued its landmark opinion in Hudgens, which expressly overruled Logan
Valley. A retail shoe store in a large mall was picketed by the store's
warehouse employees who were on strike at another location. The mall's
general manager ordered the pickets to cease picketing and threatened
them with arrest for trespassing. The Board, relying on Logan Valley,
held that the employer violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act."2
27. 407 U.S. at 568.
28. 407 U.S. at 570 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 584 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
30. See, e.g., Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 468 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1972) (on remand);
McDonald's Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. 404, 84 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1973); S.E. Nichols, Inc., 200
N.L.R.B. 1130, 82 L.R.R.M. 1334 (1972); Dexter Thread Mills, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. 543, 81
L.R.R.M. 1293 (1972). Contra, Scholle Chemical Corp. v. NLRB, 82 L.R.R.M. 2410 (7th Cir.
1972) (a per curiam unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909 (1973), in which the
court affirmed the Board's finding that no other reasonable means available to solicit a small
number of employees (350) in a Chicago plant existed other than to permit the organizers to
have access to the company's parking lot.
31. 199 N.L.R.B. at 544-45, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1294.
32. Scott Hudgens, 192 N.L.R.B. 671, 77 L.R.R.M. 1872 (1971). The Board relied on the
holding in Logan Valley. While Hudgens was pending before the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme
Court handed down Central Hardware. On remand, the Board in a supplemental opinion,
205 N.L.R.B. 628, 84 L.R.R.M. 1008 (1973), relied on its earlier decision in Visceglia, t/a
Peddie Bldgs., 203 N.L.R.B. 265, 83 L.R.R.M. 1066 (1973), enforcement denied, 498 F.2d 43
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The Court's opinion was delivered by Justice Stewart, who was joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist.
Justice Stewart referred to the fact that Justice Black, the author of the
Court's opinion in Marsh v. Alabama, had filed a vigorous dissenting
opinion in Logan Valley. Quoting from that dissenting opinion, the Court
said:
The question is, Under what circumstances can private property be
treated as though it were public? The answer that Marsh gives is when
that property has taken on all the attributes of a town, i.e., "residential
buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a 'business block' on which business places are situated." 326 U.S. at 502. I can
find nothing in Marsh which indicates that if one of these features is
present, e.g., a business district, this is sufficient for the Court to confiscate a part of an owner's private property and give its uses to people who
want to picket on it....
To hold that store owners are compelled by law to supply picketing
areas for pickets to drive store customers away is to create a court-made
law wholly disregarding the constitutional basis on which private ownerT s
ship of property rests in this country.
The rationale of Logan Valley, the majority said, had not survived the
Court's decision in Lloyd. The majority concluded that the "constitutional guarantee of free expression has no part to play in a case such as

this" 4 and observed that the rights and liabilities of the parties were dependent exclusively on the NLRA. The task of the Board, the court said,
was
[T]o resolve conflicts between §7 rights and private property rights, "and
to seek proper accommodation between the two." Central Hardware Co.
v. NLRB, 407 U.S. at 543. What is "a proper accommodation" in any

situation may largely depend upon the content and the context of the §7
rights being asserted.88

The Court noted that the context of section 7 activity in Hudkens was
different in several respects from the context of the activity in Babcock &
Wilcox and Central Hardware, and observed that:
First, it involved lawful economic strike activity rather than organizational activity .... Second, the §7 activity here was carried on by But(3d Cir. 1974), to find Hudgens violated the Act. (The Board's decision in Visceglia, which
concerned picketing in support of an economic strike at an industrial park, was bottomed on
the principles set forth in Babcock & Wilcox.)
33. 424 U.S. at 516-17 (quoting 391 U.S. at 332-33 (Black, J., dissenting)) (emphasis in
original).
34. Id. at 521.
35. Id.
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ler's employees (albeit not employees of its shopping center store), not by
outsiders.. .. Third, the property interests impinged upon in this case
were not those of the employer against whom the §7 activity was directed
but of another.
.. . The Babcock & Wilcox opinion established the basic objective
under the Act: accommodation of §7 rights and private property rights
"with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of
the other." The locus of that accommodation, however, may fall at differing points along the spectrum depending on the nature and strength
of the respective § 7 rights and private property rights asserted in any
given context."
The Court then vacated the decision of the court below and remanded
the case to the Board for consideration under the criteria of the Act.
On remand, the Board, in a Second Supplemental Decision,8 7 analyzed
the three factors that the Supreme Court had considered in distinguishing Hudgens from CentralHardware and Babcock & Wilcox. The Board,
referring to the first distinction, said that the section 7 activity involved
in Babcock & Wilcox and Central Hardware was organizational activity
by nonemployees, while the section 7 activity involved in Hudgens consisted of lawful economic picketing by employees of one of Hudgens' tenants. Since such activity is fully recognized as being protected by section
7,* the Board said that such "economic activity deserves at least equal

deference. ' ' 9
The Board, referring to the second distinction-the picketers were
store employees and not outsiders-said: "[T]he employee status of the
pickets here entitled them to at least as much protection as would be
afforded to nonemployee organizers."' Another distinction, the Board
noted, between organizational and economic strike activity is the characteristic of the audience at which the section 7 activity is directed. In an
organizational campaign, the Board said, the protected group is the unorganized employees, who often are accessible by means of communications
other than by entering upon the "employer's property .... ,,41 However,
in this case, the Board stated, the intended audience consisted of the
"buying public who might, when seeing [the primary employer's] window
display.

.

., think of doing business with that one employer"' and em-

ployees of the struck employer. Although the nonstriking employees are a
36.
37.
38.
other
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 522 (emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted).
Scott Hudgens, 230 N.L.R.B. 414, 95 L.R.R.M. 1351 (1977).
See, e.g., NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 672 (1951), and
cases cited at 230 N.L.R.B. at 416 n.20, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1353 n.20.
230 N.L.R.B. at 416, 95 L.R.R.M: at 1353.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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"clearly defined group," the more important audience of potential customers does not become established until it decides to enter the store.
This group, the Board found, is not as easily reached as employees, and
the mass media used by the shopping center to attract customers (radio,
television and newspapers) is not a "'reasonable' means of communication for employee pickets seeking to publicize their labor dispute with a
single store in the Mall."' 4 Picketing at the perimeter of the shopping
center would not be effective, the Board opined, because it "would be too
greatly diluted to be meaningful.""' Furthermore, safety considerations
and the possibility of pickets enmeshing neutral employers militate
against denying access to the pickets.
In regard to the third distinction noted, i.e., the property interest impinged upon, the Board found that Hudgens' property right to exclude
certain types of activity from his property "must yield to the section 7
right of lawful primary economic picketing directed against an employer
doing business on that Mall."' 4 The walkways on the common area are
open to the public, which has a standing invitation to visit the mall. The
Board said that "specific intent to buy is not a prerequisite to invitee
status .... ." The Board went on to say that the picketers, as members
of the public, were within the scope of the invitation and welcome so long
as they did not picket. Pointing out Hudgens' economic interest in the
tenants' performance by virtue of Hudgens receiving a percentage of the
tenants' gross sales as part of its rental arrangement, the Board rejected
Hudgens' contention that he was a neutral. The Board concluded by
saying:
[In finding that the Babcock & Wilcox criteria are satisfied and that, in
these circumstances, Hudgens' property rights must yield to the pickets'
§7 rights, we are simply subjecting the businesses on the Mall to the
same risk of §7 activity as similar businesses fronting on public sidewalks
7
now endure.'
III.

POST-HUDGENS DEVELOPMENTS

In its first post-Hudgens decision, Holland Rantos Co.,4 8 the Board
found that the owner of an industrial park violated the Act by preventing
striking employees of one of its tenants from picketing on its premises in
front of the tenant's entrance. The Board adopted the decision of the
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 417, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1353.
Id., 95 L.R.R.M. at 1354.
Id. at 418, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1355.
Id.
234 N.L.R.B. 726, 97 L.R.R.M. 1376 (1978), enforced, 583 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1978).
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Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) without comment. In a classic example
of specious reasoning, the ALJ stated that the industrial park owner was
not an innocent bystander when it provided, like in Hudgens, "security
service to insure prosperous tenants. '4 9 Restricting the pickets to almost
one thousand feet from the entrance to the tenant's leased premises, the
ALJ found, prevented the pickets from effectively communicating with
occupants of vehicles who were entering and leaving. The ALJ rejected
the argument that mass media was a reasonable communication alternative when the intended audience was nonstriking employees, suppliers,
customers, vendors, and common carriers. Although mass media could be
used to contact the employer's nonstriking employees, suppliers, and vendors, whose names were known, the union apparently did not know the
names of the common carriers making pickups and deliveries at the
struck location. The ALJ said:
[S]ince the test of use of alternative means of communication requires
that the alternative means be a "reasonable" means, and since the Board
has rejected use of mass media, the Union's message, regardless of the
Union's ability to pay for the mass media, will not be communicated
directly to the intended audience,. . . the use of mass media here is not
reasonable, even if the union funds were sufficient therefor [sic] since the
intended audience would [not] be reasonably reached1 0
Discussing the impingement on the landlord's property rights, the ALJ
noted that, unlike Hudgens, there is no general invitation to the public to
use roads that essentially are open to the public. Although the pickets
were not within the broad scope of invitee status, as in Hudgens, they
were not strangers to the access road. Both before and after the strike
began the struck employees enjoyed the "parallel" right, possessed by the
struck employer, to use the access road.51 The ALJ went on to reason that
"[w]hatever the right of [the struck employer] to exclude its striking employees from its property," it is entirely another matter for the owner of
an industrial park to discriminatorily exclude a certain class of tenant's
49. Id. at 734, 97 L.R.R.M. at 1376. Under this reasoning, a landlord would not be an
"innocent bystander" since most landlords, usually because of the terms of the lease, do
provide certain services that are designed to "insure prosperous tenants." Would maintenance, snow removal, or supplying outside lighting destroy a landlord's otherwise neutral
position?
50. - Id. at 736 (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted).
51. In NLRB v. Visceglia, 498 F.2d 43, 50 (3d Cir. 1974), denying enforcement of 203
N.L.R.B. 625, 83 L.R.R.M. 1066 (1973), the Third Circuit, in refusing to enforce the Board's
order in a similar case, noted that in that case, unlike the instant case, the striking employees, coming from another facility of the struck employer, had no right before the strike to
use the access road.
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employees because they engaged in protected section 7 activities.5 2 The
ALJ, citing NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,'5 ruled that this distinction violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Why an employer may exclude
from his property striking employees, but at the same time the owner of
an industrial park may not exclude the tenant's striking employees, is not
explained in the decision, and the rationale is not easily discernible.
As previously mentioned, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have recently
ruled on the right of nonemployees to engage in allegedly protected section 7 activities on private property adjacent to the entrances to retail
stores." In Hutzler Brothers, the Fourth Circuit held that the General
Counsel had not sustained his burden of proving that the nonemployee
organizers had no other reasonable means of communicating with the employees of a freestanding department store located in the Baltimore metropolitan area. While handbilling store employees on the store's property,
nonemployee organizers were ordered, under threat of arrest, to leave the
premises by the store's security guards. Subsequently, the store denied a
union request for a list of the names and addresses of its employees. The
union made no other effort to communicate with the employees either at
home or on the public sidewalks adjacent to the store. No specific evidence was offered at the hearing on the difficulty that would be involved
in contacting employees off the store premises.
To facilitate effective communication, the store argued that other reasonable means of contacting the employees existed. Hutzler suggested
that the organizers could have come onto the parking lot to copy license
plate numbers from the employees' cars and could have copied the names
of the employees from name tags they were required to wear. The AU
rejected both of these suggestions as being surreptitious and not practical.
The ALJ found, and the Board agreed, that the employees were beyond
the reach of reasonable union efforts though other available means of
communication existed. 5' The AIJ specifically found newspapers, includ52. 234 N.L.R.B. at 736 (emphasis in original).
53. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
54. Hutzler Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 630 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1980); Giant Food Mkts., Inc. v.
NLRB, 633 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1980).
55. 241 N.L.R.B. No. 141, 101 L.R.R.M. at 1062 (1979). The Board's holding appears to
be irreconcilable with the Board's earlier decision in Rochester Gen. Hosp., 234 N.L.R.B.
253, 97 L.R.R.M. 1410 (1978), in which the Board held that a large hospital located in Rochester, New York (presumably open to the public) did not violate the Act by denying access
to nonemployee organizers. The Board noted that the union made no effort to organize the
employees through pro-union employees, leafleting at nearby bus stops, or distributing literature at several nearby intersections when employees were entering and leaving the hospital.
Also, the Board in Rochester General stated that the union made no effort to use alternative channels of communications, such as print, broadcast media, bus placards, bumper
stickers, or signs displayed at public roadways near the hospital. The Board, rejecting the
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ing use of community newspapers, radio, and television not to be reasonable means of communicating due to the cost. He ruled out mail, telephone, and home visits as a means because the union had no reasonable
way of obtaining names and addresses of employees. The fact that the
respondent opened his property to the public was given by the ALJ as an
additional reason for his conclusion. He said:
I am mindful of the Court's decision in Central HardwareCo., v. NLRB,
[sic] 407 U.S. 539 (1972) rejecting an argument that the union had a
right to access to an owner's property because the owner had diluted the
property just by opening it to the general public; however, I do not understand the Court to have intended by its holding to preclude reliance
on the public nature of the property as a factor to be weighed in the
accommodation of rights dictated by Babcock & Wilcox."
On cross petitions, the Fourth Circuit, citing the Supreme Court's decisions in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins,5 Hudgens v. NLRB,
and Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, said that nonemployees normally have no
right to enter upon an employer's property, and the employer is entitled
to protection in the enjoyment of his property. The Supreme Court's decision in Central Hardware,the Court said, "has placed on the union the
burden of proving inaccessibility and the ineffectiveness of alternate
means of communication."" Quoting from the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters," the court said:
To gain access, the union has the burden of showing that no other reasonable means of communicating its organizational message to the employees exists or that the employer's access rule discriminates against
union solicitation. That the burden imposed on the union is a heavy one
is evidenced by the fact that the balance struck by the Board and the
Court under the Babcock accommodation principle has rarely been in
favor of trespassory organizational activity."
Acknowledging that the employees were "highly isolated from union solicitation""' the court said:
The ultimate question, however, is not whether organizational contact
of employees is difficult but whether the difficulty can be reasonably
argument that many employees are indistinguishable because they do not wear uniforms,
observed that many plant employees were organized who did not wear uniforms.
56. 241 N.L.R.B. No. 141 (slip opinion of AU Decision at 9).
57. 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980).
58. 630 F.2d at 1016.

59. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
60. 630 F.2d at 1016 (footnotes omitted).
61. Id. at 1017.
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overcome. There indeed may be situations where the combination of
physical location, type of work, and employer activity make it apparent
that reasonable alternative methods of communications do not exist. In
such cases it would not be necessary to prove the futility of attempting
alternate means of communication by active efforts on .the part of union
organizers. To prove that access to employer property is required, it is
not necessary that every possible means of communication be exhausted. This, of course, again involves the question of drawing the evidentiary line. As employees become more isolated and the task of communicating with them becomes more difficult-less efforts may be
required of union organizers to garner evidence that alternate reasonable
means of communication are available."
The court opined that the union organizational efforts were "lackadaisical" and success of these efforts seemed improbable.' The court concluded that there was not substantial evidence to sustain the Board's
finding that access was required because no other reasonable available
avenues of communication existed.
A month later, the Sixth Circuit handed down its decision in Giant
Food Markets, Inc. v. NLRB." This case is particularly interesting because, as the court said:
This appeal presents a case of first impression, involving whether or not
trespassory area standards picketing in front of one store in a two-store
shopping center is protected under section 7 of the NLRA ...
and correlatively, whether or not a demand to leave the private property when
unaccompanied by threat or force, is violative of section 8(a)(1)."

Giant Food concerned a building that was divided into two retail stores,
with a parking lot separating the two stores from the public thoroughfare.
Kresge leased the building from the owner and operated one of the two
stores as a K-Mart store. It subleased the other store to Giant Food, who
in turn operated it as a supermarket. Shortly after Giant Food opened its
store, the Retail Clerks Union picketed on the private sidewalk in front of
Giant Food in order to protest the store's alleged failure to comply with
area standards. Representatives of Kresge and Giant Food demanded,
without making any threats, that the pickets leave the premises. The
Board first noted that area standards picketing, which it held in prior
cases to be lawful in the absence of any object proscribed by the Act, is
designed to protect benefits it obtained for employees employed by other
62. Id. (emphasis supplied).
63. Compare NLRB v. Tamiment, Inc., 451 F.2d 794, 797-99 (3d Cit. 1971), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1012 (1972).
64. 633 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1980).
65. Id. at 19.
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employers." It is the legitimate nature of the picketing that the Board
believed made the conduct affirmatively protected by section 7 of the Act.
The Board remarked that, as the Court pointed out in Hudgens, the "locus" of accommodation of section 7 rights and property rights, under the
Babcock & Wilcox test, "may fall at differing points along the spectrum
depending on the nature and strength of the respective §7 rights and private property rights asserted in any given context."6 The fact that the
protected employees are not employed by the picketed employer in area
standards picketing cases is not as important, the Board said, as the fact
that the employer being picketed is the employer with whom the union
has the dispute. The Board went on to point out that the intended audience was potential customers of Giant Food who did not become identifiable until they decided to enter the store, which may have been on an
impulse when they saw the store's display window." The Board noted
that picketing at the perimeter of the shopping center, some 250 feet
away from the store, would so greatly dilute the union's message that it
would not be meaningful. The Board panel went on to say:
It is true that Respondents here do have a right to control the use of
their property, either as owner or as lessees. It is also true that the fact
that this property is generally held open to the public, that in fact the
public is invited, does not give rise to a constitutional right of anyone to
use the property for his own purpose in disregard for Respondents'
wishes. However, in weighing the statutory rights of pickets against the
property rights of Respondents, such openness to the public is a factor
which may be considered. Surely, in the absence of picket signs and
handbills, these same individuals would be welcome on the site during
business hours as potential customers. "Specific intent to buy is not a
prerequisite to invitee status ... ." That the property here is open to
the public also distinguishes this case from Babcock & Wilcox and similar cases where the property is fenced off or otherwise closed to the general public.6B
The Board concluded that the respondents' property rights had to yield
to the pickets' section 7 rights. Because the pickets were engaged in activity protected by section 7 of the Act, the Board held that the respondents
violated the Act by demanding that the pickets leave the property.7 0
66. 241 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 100 L.R.R.M. 1598 (1979).
67. 100 L.R.R.M. at 1599.
68. 100 L.R.R.M. at 1600.
69. Id. (emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted).
70. The Board's holding appears to overrule S.E. Nichols, 200 N.L.R.B. 1130, 82
L.R.R.M. 1134 (1972), in which the Board found that an employer did not violate § 8(a)(1)
when it caused the arrest of union organizers who were picketing and handbilling (presumably protected activity) in a shopping center parking lot. There the ALJ followed the princi-
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The court, after noting that under the Supreme Court's holding in
Hudgens, constitutional rights of free speech do not apply to union picketing in privately owned shopping centers, said that section 7 rights must
be balanced against private property rights of property owners under the
standards set out in Babcock & Wilcox. The goal, the court observed, as
in any case concerning organizational activity on private property, is to
provide that the union be able to communicate with the employees. The
court noted, however, that here the union had not attempted to communicate with employees; instead, its audience was consumers and potential
patrons.
The court said that it is "beyond dispute" that area standards picketing is protected under section 7 of the NLRA.7 1 Referring to the majority
opinion in Sears, 2 in which Justice Stevens described area standards
picketing as a recently evolved right and raised serious questions as to
whether area standards picketing is entitled to the same deference as organizational solicitation, the Sixth Circuit said that the recent recognition
of it as a protected activity does not make it any less protected. Additionple set out in Babcock & Wilcox, concluding that there was no evidence that there was no
other reasonable means of communication available.
71. 633 F.2d at 22.
72. 436 U.S. 180 (1978). In Sears, Justice Stevens said:
That the burden imposed on the union is a heavy one is evidenced by the fact that
the balance struck by the Board and the courts under the Babcock accommodation principle has rarely been in favor of trespassory organizational activity.
Even on the assumption that picketing to enforce area standards is entitled to
the same deference in the Babcock accommodation analysis as organizational solicitation,'" it would be unprotected in most instances.
436 U.S. at 205-06. Footnote 42 of the Court's opinion is revealing:
This assumption, however, is subject to serious question. Indeed, several factors
make the argument for protection of trespassory area-standards picketing as a category of conduct less compelling than that for trespassory organizational solicitation. First, the right to organize is at the very core of the purpose for which the
NLRA was enacted. Area-standards picketing, in contrast, has only recently been
recognized as a §7 right. Hod Carriers Local 41 (Calumet Contractors Ass'n), 133
N.L.R.B. 512 (1961). Second, Babcock makes clear that the interests being protected by according limited access rights to nonemployee, union organizers are not
those of the organizers but of the employees located on the"employer's property.
The Court indicated that "no . . . obligation is owed nonemployee organizers";
any right they may have to solicit on an employer's property is a derivative of the
right of that employer's employees to exercise their organization rights effectively.
Area-standards picketing, on the other hand, has no such vital link to the employees located on the employer's property. While such picketing may have a beneficial effect on the compensation of those employees, the rationale for protecting
area-standards picketing is that a union has a legitimate interest in protecting the
wage standards of its members who are employed by competitors of the picketed
employer.,
Id. at 206.
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ally, the court held that "area standards pickets must be allowed a reasonable means of communicating with the consumers."' "7 Refusing to
adopt Justice Stevens' rationale in Sears, the court, in a footnote said,
inter alia:
When nonemployees are engaged in trespassory activity, they must
meet the heavy burden of showing that other reasonable means of communication are not available....

Since other reasonable means may be

available when the intended audience consists of employees, [Citations
omitted] the Board and the courts have rarely upheld trespassory organizational activity ....

After Sears, however, it remained to be seen how

the Board and the courts would deal with trespassory area standards activity. Justice Stevens voiced his reservations about the protection given
area standards picketing since he believed that it is not at the "core of
the purpose for which the NLRA was enacted" and does not have a "vital link to the employees located on the employer's property." . . . As

Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, however, Justice Stevens relied substantially on the Babcock & Wilcox language for his conclusion
that trespassory picketing by nonemployees is disfavored. Justice Brennan noted that the factual situation in Babcock & Wilcox was far different from that of "peaceful nonobstructive picketing on a parking lot
which is open to the public.". . . Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence,
also expressed concern with Justice Stevens' analysis by stressing the
fact that the Board has not had much opportunity to deal with trespassory area standards picketing under a pure Babcock & Wilcox analysis
since it has been "diverted" by the First Amendment considerations of
Logan Valley until it was irrevocably overruled by Hudgens in 1976. Although Justice Stevens did command a majority of the Court, there was
far from unanimity on his dicta relating to area standards activity. It
would be stretching this dicta too much to conclude that his statements
were necessarily meant as pronouncements for the future rather than de7
scriptions of the past. '
The court noted that the Babcock & Wilcox principle of accommodation
"logically applies to any protected activity."5 Therefore, this case should

be fitted into the Babcock & Wilcox construct and the respective rights
balanced.

The court, assuming that it was easier to communicate with employees
than potential customers in a large metropolitan retail store, went on to

say that a union trying to communicate with such potential customers
should not be required to resort to "expensive, extensive mass media or
73. 633 F.2d at 24.
74. Id. at 23 n.13 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted). In a concurring opinion to
Sears, Justice Powell said "Such 'area standards' trespassory picketing is certainly not at
the core of the Act's protective ambit." 436 U.S. at 214.
75. 633 F.2d at 24.
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mailer campaigns."7 Thus, reasonable alternatives in communicating do
not include exorbitant or even heavy expenses. The court reasoned that a
mass media campaign diffuses the effectiveness of the communication by
being physically removed from the store whose policies are at issue and
by preventing any personal contact between the union and the intended
audience. The issue was not one of communicating by picketing versus
communicating by non-picketing; instead, the issue was one of locating
the pickets on private property near the store entrance or locating them
on public property near the entrance to the parking lot. The court noted
that the Board had concluded that the picketing on public property was
not an effective, reasonable means of communicating because it would be
diluted by the distance from the store and would enmesh Giant Food's
lessor, S.S. Kresge, in the dispute. However, the court said that the ALJ
disposed of this case on the basis that the demand to leave the premises
unaccompanied by any threat was not a violation of the Act. The court
said that the problem with the approach taken by the ALJ is that, by
first addressing the section 8(a)(1) issue, his decision left unanswered
whether the conduct is protected. The court, citing the Board's holding in
Clyde Taylor Co., 7 7 said that since the filing for injunctive relief has been
held not to be violative of section 8(a)(1), the union is "left without recourse, and the state of the law continues to remain uncertain."7 8 Since
state law requires a demand to vacate as a condition precedent to obtaining an injunction, such a demand, the court said, "becomes an integral part of the state court action that is not itself an unfair labor practice. 17 A method of resolving whether the picketing is protected by
section 7 is for the union to file a section 8(a)(1) charge with the Board.
The court went on to say:
These issues are intertwined and cannot be dealt with separately. Addressing the section 7 question without considering the 8(a)(1) issue ignores the crux of the case. On the other hand, if the Board finds that the
activity is protected, it must proceed to consider the 8(a)(1) charge. Two
approaches are then apparent even though neither is particularly appealing. The Board could find that, although the activity was protected, a
peaceful demand to cease that activity is not violative of section 8(a)(1).
Alternatively, once a finding has been made that the activity is protected, the demand to leave is automatically determined to be a violation. The appropriate approach to this problem should be devised, in the
first instance, by the Board.76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
127 N.L.R.B. 103, 45 L.R.R.M. 1514 (1960).
633 F.2d at 25.
Id.
Id. at 25-26 (footnote omitted).
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The court indicated that once the Board held the picketing protected,
it should have referred the matter back to the ALJ rather than proceeding to rule on the section 8(a)(1) question. Suggesting that the Board
could only rule on that question based either on its own conclusions from
the record before the ALJ or on the basis of the Board's knowledge and
labor relations expertise, the court said: "Both parts of this assumption
are, however, troublesome. Both the dilution of message and enmeshing
neutral employers' theories which appear to be at the crux of the Board's
opinion, are cited by the Board without case authority and, perhaps more
importantly, without reference to supporting facts in the record." 1 The
entire testimony for the General Counsel was presented by the president
of the union who did not participate in the picketing. As in Hutzler, the
court concluded that there was a lack of evidence bearing on the reasonableness of the alternative location for the picketing-such as evidence of
traffic flows or evidence showing that picketing off the premises was not
as effective as picketing on the premises. The court went on to rule that it
could not find substantial evidence to support the Board's holding. It set
aside the Board's Order and directed that the case be remanded to take
further evidence on the questions presented, i.e., as to the dilution of the
picketing and the effect on neutrals when conducted on the perimeter of
the shopping center.
Several months after the Board's decision in Giant Food was issued,
the Board decided in Seattle-FirstNational Bank s8 that the owner of an
office building violated section 8(a)(1) by threatening to arrest union
members who were handbilling in the foyer of a restaurant located on the
forty-sixth floor. The restaurant employees had gone on strike. Union
members, including at least one striking employee,6 ' commenced handbilling customers in the foyer, as well as picketing and handbilling on the
public sidewalks at the building's entrances and exits. The Board stated
that the union was engaged in "primary, economic strike activity,"" an
activity protected by section 7 of the Act. The Board analogized the factual setting to that in Hudgens. As in Hudgens and Giant Food, the
Board held that the communications were intended for nonstriking restaurant employees and potential restaurant customers. Unlike the intended audience in the shopping center cases that enters onto the premises in private cars, the intended audience in a dispute involving an office
81. Id. at 26 (emphasis supplied).
82. 243 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 101 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1979).
83. The union continued to assign members to the 46th floor, but after the first 43 days
of the strike, none of the members were employees of the restaurant. The Board failed to
discuss what effect, if any, should be given to the cessation of this activity by the restaurant
employees.
84. 101 L.R.R.M. at 1538.
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building, for the most part, enters onto the premises on foot. The parties
had stipulated that those entering the building were "very likely to see
the picket signs advertising the labor dispute."" Notwithstanding this
stipulation, the Board said that restricting the picketing to "the public
sidewalks would excessively hinder the union's efforts to communicate a
meaningful message to the intended audience."" The customers become
recognizable, the Board observed, when they were about to enter the restaurant from the foyer.8 7 The Board stated that many of the restaurant's
lunchtime customers worked in the building and might enter the restaurant hours after crossing the picket line. Other customers may not have
been aware of or had plans to eat in the restaurant when they first entered the building, the Board said. The Board found the "Union's presence in the foyer . . . essential to its ability to effectively communicate
with its intended audience."" The Board said that the foyer "area is open
to the public and is used by people wishing to patronize [the restaurant],
visit the stock brokerage firm on the 46th floor, or change elevators to
visit tenants on the 47th floor.""9
On review, the Ninth Circuit" upheld the Board's holding that the
building owner violated the Act by ordering the union members to leave
the foyer area. Unlike the Board, which characterized the section 7 activity as "handbilling," the court characterized it as picketing in support of
an economic strike. "These persons," the court said, "did not carry placards, but sometimes held leaflets in front of them like placards, in effect
forcing restaurant customers and nonstriking employees to cross a picket
line.""1 The court, citing the Board's Second Supplemental Decision in
Hudgens,s9 stated that crucial to the Board's holding was the finding that
the pickets could not identify the audience, i.e., the potential customers,

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Unlike the retail store cases in which shoppers are induced by display windows to
enter stores, most restaurants located in commercial office buildings do not have display
windows, signs, or other physical features that induce persons within the building to come
into the restaurant. Patrons of these restaurants, generally, have an intent to become a patron prior to their seeing the entrance to the restaurant.
88. 101 L.R.R.M. at 1538 (emphasis supplied). The Court's holding in Babcock & Wilcox
was designed solely to assure that the union's message reached the intended audience. It
was not designed to give the union access to the most effective place to communicate. See
351 U.S. at 108. In this case the parties stipulated that those entering the building "very
likely" saw the picket signs. This raises the question: Does the Board's decision indicate it is
going to measure, not whether the message gets to the audience, but rather how effective the
communication is on the intended audience?
89. 101 L.R.R.M. at 1538 (emphasis supplied).
90. Seattle-Firat Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 105 L.R.R.M. 3411 (1980).
91. Id. at 3412.
92. 230 N.L.R.B. 414, 95 L.R.R.M. 1351 (1977).
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as people first entered the mall. A contrary holding in Hudgens, the court
noted, would have resulted in insulating the store owners in the mall from
the effects of picketing, "a union's most effective weapon in a strike."'8 In
applying the teachings of Hudgens, the court commented, as though Logan Valley had not been overruled, that
The presence of a limited number of picketers in the foyer conducting
themselves in a manner that does not impede the use of those facilities
on that floor not associated with the restaurant would not substantially

injure the petitioner's property rights. A burden of this magnitude is justified because the petitioner has sanctioned an invitation to the public to

patronize the restaurant."
As to the right of a union to confront the public by means of picketing in
an economic strike, the court said:
Picketing is more than mere dissemination of information. "The loyalties
and responses evoked by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by printed words." Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465

(1950). The union's picketing is clearly much more effective on the 46th
floor, where restaurant customers and nonstriking employees are identifiable, than at the entrance to the building6
The court concluded by suggesting that picketing in support of an economic strike is at the core of the NLRA. ."A different accommodation
might be appropriate," the court said, "if some activity not at the core of
section 7, such as area standards picketing, were at issue."' The court,
noting that the Board's Order failed to limit the number of pickets permitted in the foyer area or to proscribe their conduct, remanded the case
to the Board for the purpose of imposing such restrictions on the
7
picketing.9

93. 105 L.R.R.M. at 3412.
94. Id. at 3414 (emphasis supplied). Does the court mean to suggest that the interference
with the use of the restaurant is to be disregarded? See note 85 supra.
95. Id.

96. Id.
97.

In restricting the picketing activity in the foyer area, the court said:
[S]ome activity that is normally permitted during a strike is inappropriate in a
foyer of a 50-story office building. For example, a large number of picketers patrolling with placards and chanting slogans might disturb business conducted in
that portion of the 46th floor not occupied by the restaurant,disturb business on
other floors, interfere with persons changing elevators to go to the 47th floor, or
otherwise cause congestion that might lead to violence or damage petitioner's
property.
Id. at 3415 (emphasis supplied).
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IV.

Is LOGAN VALLEY STILL ALIVE?

In reviewing the decisions of the Board and the courts since the Supreme Court's holding in Hudgens, it is clear that Logan Valley is far
from dead. That decision has been reincarnated by the Board,9" but has
received mixed support from the courts."

In analyzing the current status of the law on the right of organized
labor to engage in protected section 7 activity. on quasi-public property, it
is necessary to distinguish between organizational activities directed toward employees who work on such property, and picketing-handbilling
activity directed at third parties, such as suppliers, truckers, or the consuming public.
A.

OrganizationalActivities

It appears that, if the protected activity involved is organizational in
nature and is directed towards employees, the test as stated in Babcock &
Wilcox is still controlling. The fact that the property is open to the public
should be of little, if any, significance. The test is not one of relative convenience, 100 but rather, are "the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them?" 10 1 The Court in Babcock &
Wilcox rejected the Board's view that the "place of work [is] so much
more effective a place for communication of information that . . . [an]
employer . . . [is] guilty of an unfair labor practice for refusing limited

access to company property to union organizers."102 The Court, in stating
the first prong of the two-prong test in Babcock & Wilcox, undoubtedly
had in- mind situations in which the employee's living quarters and work
location were in remote areas. 1 "3However, the Board's post-Hudgens de98. See The Developing Labor Law 11 (BNA Supp. 1977).
99. Enforcement denied, Hutzler Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 630 F.2d at 1012; Order set aside
and remanded, Giant Food Mkts. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 18; Enforcement granted, Eisenberg v.
Holland Rantos Co., 583 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1978); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 105
L.R.R.M. 3411.
100. Hutzler Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 630 F.2d at 1017.
101. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 113.
102. Id. at 108 (emphasis supplied).
103. See 351 U.S. at 111, in which the Court cites NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber
Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948). The Babcock & Wilcox holding has been applied to
remote campsites, Husky Oil NPR Operations, Inc., 245 N.L.R.B. No. 68, 102 L.R.R.M. 1450
(1979); resort hotels, S. & H. Grossinger's Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 233, 255, 61 L.R.R.M. 1025,
1029 (1965), enforced in part, 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967); company-owned homes, Joseph
Bancroft & Sons Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1288, 1291-92, 52 L.R.R.M. 1218, 1219 (1963); and
steamships and towboats, Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 423, 424, 84 L.R.R.M.
1275, 1277 (1973), enforcement denied, 599 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Sioux City &
New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 472 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1973); Ingram Barge Co., 204
N.L.R.B. 63, 66, 83 L.R.R.M. 1311, 1312 (1973).
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cisions seem to have adopted the "big city" rule that was eschewed by the
Board in Monogram Models, Inc.'"M Now, especially in metropolitan areas, the Board is likely to require owners of quasi-public property'"' to
open up their property to nonemployee organizers, unless the targeted
employees walk to work and are identifiable, or unless the union is able to
obtain a list of the employees' names and addresses without resorting to
extraordinary efforts such as the suggestion by the employer in
Hutzler.'
B.

Picketing and Handbilling

(1) How Much, if any, Deference Should be Given to Area
Standards Picketing? Recognitional or organizational picketing during the first thirty days and area standards picketing raise yet-to-be-answered questions as to whether these activities are in fact protected
rather than just lawful."17 If such picketing is protected, what deference,
if any, should be given to it? As noted above, 0 s Justice Stevens, author of
the Court's opinion in Sears, raised serious questions of whether area
standards picketing is entitled to as much deference in the Babcock accommodation analysis as organizational solicitation. In a footnote, he
seems to suggest that it should not be given as much deference."09
In Giant Food, the Board discussed at length the deference it felt area
standards picketing should be given. The Board noted that a union, in
attempting to protect area standards, acts not only in its own interests,
but also in the interest of the employees covered by its standard agreement. The fact that the employees for whom such picketing is designed
104. 192 N.L.R.B. at 705-06. See Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 327 (Black, J., dissenting).
105. The Board's rationale as to quasi-public facilities is that it works no hardship on
the property owner to require him to open his public areas to organizers. However, this
rationale could just as easily be applied to non-working areas on property that is not open to
the public, such as employee parking lots and cafeterias.
106. Carter and Forrester, in a recent law review article, Solicitation and Distribution
on Retail Store Premises, 30 LAB. L.J. 559, 563 (1979), said, in reference to the Board's
decision in Hutzler, that: "The Board is evidently creating a virtual requirement that the
employer tender a list of the names and addresses of its employees to the union in order for
mail, telephone calls, home visits, or other personal contacts to become reasonable alternative channels of communication." Contra, Rochester Gen. Hosp. 234 N.L.R.B. 253, 97
L.R.R.M. 1410.
107. In Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970), a case
concerning the question of preemption, the majority of the Court suggested that area standards picketing is arguably protected under §7 of the Act. However, Justice White, in a
concurring opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, held that area standards picketing that is "peaceful" and "non-obstructive" is actually protected. Id. at 202.
108. See Giant Food Mkts., Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 18, 24 (6th Cir. 1980).
109. 436 U.S. at 206 n.42.
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[t]o benefit are not those of the' picketed employer is not as important in
our view as is that [sic] fact that the employer being picketed is the employer with whom the union has the dispute. . . . Moreover, there is a
strong possibility in such a situation that such union activity, if successful, will inure to the benefit of the employees through increased
compensation. 110
The Board in rejecting Justice Stevens' suggestion that area standards
picketing should be given less deference than organizational activity said:
The plurality opinion of the Supreme Court in Sears, although recognizing that it was the Board's task, in the first instance, to accommodate
the competing interests involved, suggested (but did not specifically
find), that area standards picketing may be entitled to less protection
than was given the organizational solicitation involved in Babcock ...
For the reasons set forth above, we respectfully consider that the Court
did not fully examine and set forth the differences between such oral
solicitation and consumer picketing and the Unions [sic] substantial justification for seeking to maintain area standards. See also the concurring
opinion of Justice Blackmum (437 U.S. at 210), and the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan (436 U.S. at 231)."'
The Sixth Circuit, in adopting the Board's reasoning on the accommodations to be given to area standards picketing, said:
Although Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 206 n.42 (1978), described area standards
picketing as a recently evolved right, its mere lack of longevity should
make it no less protected at this junction.. . . Babcock & Wilcox specifically centered on the organizational rights of employees, but its rationale
and principle of accommodation logically applies to any protected union
activity.''

110. 100 L.R.R.M. at 1600. The Board, without referring to any testimony or studies,
assumes there is a "strong possibility" that the picketing will help the employees of the
picketed employer. However, absent any such study, it seems more probable that the employees' job security may be threatened if the picketing has its desired effect on the primary
employer's business, and he is unwilling or unable to meet area standards.
111. Id. The Board's reference to "the plurality opinion" in Sears is misleading. In addition to the "plurality opinion" written by Justice Stevens, and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist, Justice Powell voiced the same sentiment in a concurring opinion when he said: "Such 'area standards' trespassory picketing is certainly not
at the core of the Act's protecbive ambit." 436 U.S. at 214.
112. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2919-20. Using this rationale, must the owner and operator of a
shopping center permit non-shopping center employee union agents to come onto the property and engage in demonstrations in support of labor legislation because such activity is for
the mutual aid and benefit of employees in general and because such activity is protected
under § 7? See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 574 (1978). Although the Supreme
Court decision in Eastex would seem to suggest that the Board should not make a distinc-
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However, the Ninth Circuit, in Seattle-First National Bank,", said "[a]
different accommodation might be appropriate if some activity not at the
core of section 7, such as area standards picketing, were at issue," citing
to Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Sears.""
It will probably require a decision by the Supreme Court to resolve
what deference, if any, should be given to area standards picketing and
recognitional/organizational picketing during the first thirty days. If deference is granted to area standards picketing, how long shall such picketing be permitted? In Babcock & Wilcox, the court said: "But when the
inaccessibility of the employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempt
by nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual channels,
the right to exclude from property has been required to yield to the extent needed to permit communication of information on the right to organize. '""' In Central Hardware,referring to the extent such accommodation must be made, the Court said:
The principle of Babcock is limited to this accommodation between
organizational rights and property rights. The principle requires a "yielding" of the property rights in the context of an organizational campaign.
Moreover, the allowed intrusion on property rights is limited to that necessary to facilitate the exercise of employees' section 7 rights. After the
requisite need for access to the employer's property has been shown, the
access is limited to (i) union organizers; (ii) prescribed non-working areas of the employer's premises; and the duration of organization activity. In short, the principle of accommodation announced in Babcock is

limited to labor organization campaigns, and the "yielding" of property
rights it may require is both temporary and minimal." 6

It is suggested that if such picketing is given deference, it be permitted
only for a length of time sufficient for the union to be able to notify most
tion between various § 7 activities in applying Babcock & Wilcox, the General Counsel's
office in a recent Advice Memorandum did make a distinction as to the type of § 7 activity
involved. The General Counsel's office in Meijer, Inc., Sagebrush Div., 243 N.L.R.B. No. 109,
101 L.R.R.M. 1529 (1979), concluded that although the union was engaged in protected informational picketing to publicize its labor dispute with a newspaper against which it was
on strike and in which picketed retail stores advertised, the owner of a shopping center in
which the picketed store was located did not violate § 8(a)(1) of the Act when he demanded
that the pickets leave the premises and threatened to have them arrested. The memorandum stated that the right to picket must yield to the employer's right to control his property if (1) the employer being picketed was not the employer with whom the union had a
dispute, and (2) the picketing was aimed at consumers, but could have been done safely
adjacent to the private property.
113. 105 L.R.R.M. at 3414.
114. 436 U.S. at 214 (Powell, J., concurring).
115. 351 U.S. at 112 (emphasis supplied).
116. 407 U.S. at 544-45 (emphasis supplied).
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of the customers of the dispute. In the case of a food store, that period
may be very short, since most people shop weekly. However, for a department store, a longer time may be required. Clearly, such picketing should
not be permitted on private property for an indefinite period.
(2) Confronting the Public. Once it is determined that the activity
(picketing or handbilling) is protected, the question arises as to what test
to use. It could be to determine reasonable means to communicate with
the public, or to determine where the picketing or handbilling should be
located. As the Sixth Circuit said in Giant Food:
[T]he choice is not between disseminating information through the media away from the store itself and on-site picketing. Instead, the choice is
between locating the pickets on the private property and locating them
across the parking lot on public property adjoining
the thoroughfare and
1 17
near the entrance and exit to the parking lot.
Similarly, the Board, in its Second Supplemental Decision in Hudgens,
said:
As to these contentions, the Administrative Law Judge found and we
agree, that the mass media, appropriately used by the North DeKalb
Center and its merchants to attract customers from the Metropolitan Atlanta area, are not "reasonable" means of communication for employee
pickets seeking to publicize their labor dispute with a single store in the
Mall. Furthermore, Hudgens' suggested approach would undercut Board
and Court precedent recognizing and protecting such picketing as the
most effective way of reaching those who would enter a struck employer's
premises, including situations in which the entrance to the employer's
property is on land owned by another. 8
It appears clear that, if the picketing or handbilling is protected and
given deference equal to the organizational activities of Babcock & Wilcox, it will be permitted on the private property where the customers do
not become readily identifiable until they are on the quasi-public facility.
If there are two or more retail stores or businesses located on the same
premises, it appears that the Board will, under its new line of cases, permit the picketers and handbillers to confront the potential customers on
the private property as they approach the store. However, as suggested in
the dissenting opinion in Sears," s a union may be permitted to confront
potential consumers on private property by picketing or handbilling at
the entrances to single free-standing stores when the picketers or
handbillers are unable to communicate effectively at the perimeter of the
117. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2920.
118. 230 N.L.R.B. at 416-17, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1354.
119. 436 U.S. at 225-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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private property.12 0
V.

CONCLUSIONS

Numerous questions are still to be answered. Is the test which place is
"more effective"? Or is the test can the union reasonably and safely communicate its message to those destined to enter upon the primary employer's premises? The first test is the test the Board appears to be using, 121 although it was rejected by the Supreme Court in Babcock as to
handbilling. How is the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of the picketing
and handbilling to the general public to be measured? In Giant Food, the
Sixth Circuit said: "[B]oth parts of this assumption are, however, troublesome. Both the dilution of message and enmeshing neutral employers'
theories, which appear to be at the crux of the Board's opinion, are cited
by the Board without case authority and perhaps more importantly, without reference to supporting facts in the record.""2 One wonders how one
aquires "supporting facts" of this kind to put into the record. How do you
determine if the message is being "diluted" unless you have testimony as
to the effect of the picketing on the quasi-public property at the entrance
to the primary employer's place of business and testimony as to the effect
of the picketing at the perimeter of the quasi-public facility?
It is fair to say that the future guidelines with respect to accommodating organized labor's right to confront the public on quasi-public property
will be long in coming. Given the Board's present disposition to assume
that picketing at the perimeter enmeshes neutrals and dilutes the message, along with the questions raised by dicta in Babcock, Central Hardware, Hudgens, and Sears, there soon will be a split in the circuits, and
the Supreme Court will ultimately have to give some answers to these
questions.
If a union is permitted to confront potential customers at the point at
120. William Lubbers, General Counsel for the NLRB, announced in his report for the
third quarter of calendar 1980 that he has authorized the issuance of a complaint against an
operator of a retail store who removed handbillers from the property. The handbillers were
in an economic strike with the store's meat supplier. The handbills asked consumers not to
buy the supplier's products. The General Counsel reasoned that although the retailer was a
neutral in the dispute, the consumer handbilling was a protected activity. He said in his
report, "In our view, the 'neutral site' factor was arguably offset in the balancing process by
the fact that the Union could only reach its intended audience as it approached the premises on the neutral Employer, and that there were no public locations in the vicinity of
Employer's customers." BNA DAilY LAB. REP. No. 46, March 10, 1981, at D-2.
121. 105 L.R.R.M. at 3414. "The union's picketing is clearly much more effective on the
46th floor .... Restricting picketing to the entrance of the building would substantially
dilute the union's section 7 rights since the effectiveness of a picket line depends on location." Id.
122. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2921.
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which they become identifiable, would the union's continued picketing on
the perimeter of the quasi-public property, as in Seattle-First National
Bank, constitute a violation of the secondary boycott provisions of section
8(b)(4)(B) under the Board's Moore Dry Dock rule? 28 It would appear
the answer must be in the affirmative." '
Following the rationale that those lawfully picketing should be able to
confront potential customers when they become identifiable, as the Board
ruled in Giant Food and Seattle-First National Bank, the question is
raised as to whether protected picketing could take place inside a retail
department store immediately adjacent to a leased department with
which a union has a primary dispute. The Board's recent cases seem to
suggest the answer is yes. However, Justice Blackmun, citing in his concurring opinion in Sears1 5 to the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Marshall
Field & Co. v. NLRB, 1 6 suggested that pickets may be kept out of retail
stores. It appears clear that although Logan Valley has been expressly
overruled by the Supreme Court, the Board's current approach, with approval of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, in accommodating labor's section
7 rights with the property rights of property owners has, in effect, given
organized labor "statutory rights" which are as effective as the free
speech rights referred to in Logan Valley.

123. Sailors' Union (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 27 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1950).
124. Wire Serv. Guild, Local 222 (Miami Herald Publishing Co.), 218 N.L.R.B. 1234,
1238, 89 L.R.R.M. 1397, 1399 (1975) (Members Kennedy & Penello dissenting); Retail Fruit
& Vegetable Clerks' Local 1017 (Crystal Palace Mkt.), 116 N.L.R.B. 856, 8 9, 38 L.R.R.M.
1323, 1324 (1956), enforced 249 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1957). Accord, Local 612, Teamsters
(AAA Motor Lines, Inc.), 211 N.L.R.B. 608, 610, 87 L.R.R.M. 1029, 1029 (1974). But cf.
Wire Serv. Guild Local 222 (Miami Herald Publishing Co.), 218 N.L.R.B. 1234, 1235, 89

L.R.R.M. 1397, 1399 (1975) (area in front of primary employer's place of business was a
narrow long hall that was not well lighted.)
125. 436 U.S. at 210 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
126. 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1953).

